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Abstract (Summary)
The shortcomings of UECA are on the front end, at the point when state and local
environmental agencies decide to approve environmental covenants at a particular site.
Copyright American Planning Association Feb 2005
Restoring abandoned urban properties to productive use is essential to curtail
metropolitan sprawl. Uncertain liability regarding subsurface contamination at such sites,
however, is often an obstacle to such restoration efforts. Current owners frequently avoid
conducting soil and groundwater testing for fear that what they find may trigger an
expensive cleanup. Yet without such investigation, it is often difficult to attract
investment or financing because developers and banks fear potential cleanup costs as
well.
This is the liability dynamic that impedes the remediation and reuse of many properties
with subsurface environmental liability concerns. Such properties are commonly known
as "brownfields" and are often found in urban communities with a high percentage of
low-income, minority residents.
One response to the brownfield liability dynamic has been the joint promotion of riskbased correction action (RBCA) standards for environmental cleanups along with legallyenforceable restrictions on future land uses. These two approaches work together in the
following manner. An agency with environmental oversight at a property agrees to permit
a less expensive remediation tailored to the limited uses of the property proposed by the
current owner. In exchange, the owner agrees to record a deed restriction legally
committing itself and its successors to these proposed limited uses. Examples of this
tandem adoption of RBGA standards and land use restrictions would be a cleanup that
assumes, and a deed restriction that requires, that a property will not be used for
residential purposes or that there will not be excavation of soil beyond a certain depth. By
capping the extent and expense of cleanups, these approaches seek to stimulate
investment in brownfields.
The majority of brownfields in the United States sites are regulated by state and local
environmental agencies rather than the federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).
These state and local environmental agencies have developed different terminology to
describe the reliance on legally enforceable property use restrictions to facilitate less
expensive RBCA cleanups. Some agencies refer to them as institutional controls, while
other agencies refer to them as land use covenants, land use controls, or environmental
deed restrictions. The procedures developed by different agencies to implement these

contamination-based property restrictions are as varied as the terminology used to refer to
them. Many of these agency procedures are difficult to reconcile with real estate law,
which traditionally does not provide a role for administrative agencies and the general
public in recording and enforcing deed restrictions.
In an effort to standardize the different approaches taken by various state and local
environmental agencies around the country, and to better synthesize them with real estate
law, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCLISL)
adopted the Uniform Environmental Covenants Act (UECA) in August 2003.1 NCCUSL
has recommended UECA for adoption by individual states. Among other things, UECA
proposes the term "environmental covenants" to refer generally to enforceable property
use restrictions allowing more limited remediation of hazardous substances, and sets forth
provisions for how to record and enforce such environmental covenants.2
Although UECA's general goal of harmonization may be laudable, UECA's provisions
leave many critical brownfield questions unanswered. Most significantly, UECA does not
set forth criteria or procedures to determine when it is inappropriate for an environmental
agency to reduce cleanup costs by approving less comprehensive cleanups and by
prohibiting otherwise lawful land uses. NCCUSL intentionally left this thorny question to
state and local agencies, and instead focused UECA on integrating the mechanics of the
environmental covenant recordation and enforcement process with traditional real estate
law.
As explained below, although NCCUSL's aversion to dealing with this thorny issue may
be understandable in light of the origins of the UECA drafting process, this aversion
nonetheless renders the current UECA an incomplete piece of legislation. In its present
form, UECA facilitates and validates an approach to environmental cleanups and land use
without requiring sufficient safeguards to prevent this approach from being misused at
the expense of local communities and public health. In theory, state or local agencies
could provide these missing pieces, but experience to date has shown they often don't.
ENVIRONMENTAL COVENANTS AS LAND USE POLICY
One of the primary concerns about the potential misuse of environmental covenants
relates to their role as "backdoor zoning."
State and local law generally set forth a detailed legislative process for determining the
types of land uses and activities permitted in particular neighborhoods.3 General land use
plans (general plans) and zoning codes usually must be approved by an elected city
councilor county board of supervisors, and revisions to general plans and zoning codes
usually also require the approval of such legislative bodies and then only after a public
comment period and hearingA The adoption of environmental covenants by
environmental regulatory agencies, however, often bypasses the transparency and
political accountability in the land use policy arena provided by traditional general plan
and zoning law.

The current situation along the City of Oakland's estuary waterfront provides an example
of how environmental covenants can result in backdoor zoning. There are many
underutilized parcels along the Oakland waterfront that have historically been used, and
are presently being used, for industrial or manufacturing purposes. These uses have often
resulted in the release of hazardous substances into the subsurface, which in turn has
attracted the attention of state and county environmental agencies. To avoid potentially
expensive cleanups, owners of such waterfront sites have increasingly approached these
agencies about recording environmental covenants to prohibit future use of the land for
residential purposes. This approach all seems well and good until one considers the larger
economic and community context.
In recent years, the City of Oakland adopted zoning code changes and a comprehensive
Estuary Policy Plan that provides for the transition of many sites previously used for
industry and manufacturing to residential and parkland use.S These actions were
prompted by a shortage of housing and parkland in the area and indications that many
industrial and manufacturing operations would no longer be economically viable at these
locations in the future. In addition, a significant percentage of the population in Oakland's
waterfront neighborhoods are low-income African-American and Latino residents, and
there was concern about the public health impacts of industrial and manufacturing
operations on the surrounding community.
The changes in land use along the waterfront proposed by the City of Oakland, however,
are at odds with many of the environmental covenants now being approved by state and
county environmental agencies. These environmental covenants are designed to lock in
current industrial and manufacturing uses indefinitely, and to enable current owners to
avoid responsibility for cleaning up subsurface conditions to levels that would permit
conversion of a site to residential or parkland use. Thus, although the city zoning code
and land use law permits and encourages the transition of the waterfront from industrial
and manufacturing uses to residential and parkland uses, non-city environmental agencies
are approving environmental covenants that may make this transition impossible for
some parcels.
This is not to suggest that the use of environmental covenants is inappropriate for all
properties. There are indeed situations where circumstances suggest that it is the right
course of action, such as when the property restrictions proposed in the environmental
covenant are consistent with planning agency's and the surrounding community's longterm land use plans for a parcel. Rather, what the Oakland waterfront situation reveals is
that determinations of whether an environmental covenant is appropriate for a particular
site need to take proper account of broader local land use policies and community
considerations. This recognition is something that seems to have been lost in NCCUSL's
drafting of UECA.
For instance, Amy L. Edwards, an environmental attorney who served as an official
observer to NCCUSL's UECA drafting committee, remarked in an article on UECA that
the only way for brownfields reuse to succeed on a national level is if responsible parties
are allowed to use risk-based corrective action." Edwards's comment suggests the view

that risk-based remediation standards, which are often used in conjunction with
environmental covenants, are an appropriate approach for any brownfield site. A blanket
endorsement of this approach does not reflect the potential for risk-based cleanups and
environmental covenants to conflict with land use law and competing community
objectives. As noted below, it appears that such thinking-which posits the use of
environmental covenants as an inherently good thing, as opposed to an occasionally good
thing fraught with opportunities for misuse-was an assumption that permeated the UECA
drafting process.
UECA DRAFTING PROCESS
The origins ofNCCUSL's UECA drafting process go a long way towards explaining why
certain hard brownfields questions were not addressed.
Of paramount importance, the initial idea for UECA did not come from environmental
groups or even from federal, state, or local environmental agencies. Rather, the UECA
proposal came from the United States Department of Defense (a federal umbrella agency
for the Army, Air Force, and Navy) to help streamline environmental cleanups at military
sites around country. In September 2001, the Defense Department entered into a contract
with NCCUSL for "Research and Drafting of a Uniform Environmental Covenants and
Land Use Controls Act."7 The Defense Department footed the entire bill for the UECA
drafting process, which was budgeted for $150,000.8 From the very beginning,
therefore, the impetus and funding behind UECA came from a federal stakeholder agency
whose primary concern was expediting cleanups on property it owned, and with no
particular expertise or responsibility for public health or land use zoning.

In implementing its UECA contract with the Defense Department, NCCUSL assembled a
drafting committee that included many recognized experts in the fields of environmental
and real estate law, including Professors William Breetz and Kurt Strasser of the
University of Connecticut Law School." Representatives from the Defense Department,
EP A, and state environmental agencies also served on the drafting committee. In
reviewing the members of the UECA drafting committee, what is particularly striking is
the absence of representatives from environmental advocacy organizations such as the
Sierra Club, Natural Resources Defense Council, or Environmental Defense. There were
also no representatives from the federal National Environmental Justice Advisory
Council (NEJAC), which focuses on the impact oftoxics policy on low-income and
minority populations. 10 John Pendergrass, a well-respected senior attorney with the
Environmental Law Institute (ELI) in Washington, D.C., was part of the UECA drafting
team assembled by NCCUSL.11 ELI's role, however, is generally to find policy
consensus among different stakeholders affected by environmental regulation rather than
to specifically advocate for strengthened environmental protection.
The composition of the UECA drafting committee is very telling. It suggests that
NCCUSL and the Defense Department may not have been particularly interested in
having UECA drafting committee members who were likely to express strong
reservations about whether the use of environmental covenants should be encouraged. It

also suggests that the main national environmental advocacy groups may not have
considered the adoption ofUECA as a wise policy course, and therefore were not
inclined to lend their support to NCCUSL's effort. Regardless of why strong
environmental protection interests were not present, their absence appears to have
contributed to the underlying assumption by the UECA drafting committee that
facilitating the use of environmental covenants is a good idea. This assumption is
reflected in many ofNCCUSL's drafting documents.
For instance, in the prefatory note that accompanied the release of the final version of
UECA in August 2003, NCCUSL states:
An environmental covenant typically is used when the real property is to be
cleaned up to a level determined by the potential environmental risks posed by a
particular use, rather than to unrestricted use standards. Such risk-based
remediation is both environmentally and economically preferable in many
instances .... Large numbers of contaminated sites are unlikely to be
successfully recycled until regulators, potentially responsible parties, affected
communities, prospective purchasers and their lenders become confident that
environmental covenants will be properly drafted, implemented, monitored and
enforced for so long as needed. 12
These comments hint that there may indeed be situations when the use of risk-based
remediation and environmental covenants is not "environmentally and economically
preferable," but do not provide any further guidance on, or analysis of, this point.
Significantly, the prefatory note for UECA does not explain the basis for its
counterintuitive suggestion that a partial risk-based cleanup tied to restricted property
uses is often "environmentally preferable" to a more comprehensive cleanup where use
restrictions are not required.
Similarly, on March 24,2003, NCCUSL issued a press release with the heading "The
Uniform Environmental Covenants Act Nears Completion."13 This press release
declared:
An environmental covenant is typically used when it is necessary to clean up
contaminated property to a level determined by the environmental risks posed,
rather than to unrestricted use standards .... [UECA] can help return previously
contaminated property, often located in urban areas, to the stream of commerce,
reducing the dangers such contamination poses to our citizens, and improving the
quality of the environment in which we live.I4
This press release gives the impression that there is consensus among environmentalists,
public health advocates, and urban communities that environmental covenants should be
used more widely. In fact, there is no such consensus.IS
As University of Arizona Law Professor Kirsten Engel notes:

Due to the low land value prevailing in their communities together with their
relative political powerlessness, poor and minority communities have been
targeted historically as sites for heavy industrial development and, as a result, are
subject to a disproportionate share of the environmental hazards that frequently
accompany such development. Rather than reverse this legacy, brownfield
cleanups could actually perpetuate it. If for example, the cleanup of a brownfield
site is sufficient only for future industrial uses, the community will never escape
this industrial legacy but will continue to be located near potentially
environmentally hazardous industrial development. 16
The UECA drafting documents do not reflect an awareness or understanding of such
concerns.
As a final example, prior to entering into the formal September 2001 contract with the
Defense Department, NCCUSL assembled a UECA study committee. Many of the
members of the UECA study committee went on to later serve on the UECA drafting
committee. On July 23, 2001, the UECA study committee released a 12-page
recommendations report noting that the use of environmental covenants is "complicated
from the perspective of local communities" and that" [c]ommunity developers and local
land use planners are not usually a part of the negotiating process regarding the
disposition of Federal land and the negotiation of various land use controls."17 The
report further commented that "some opposition might be expected from environmental
groups who are opposed in principle to risk-based cleanups and hence oppose anything
that makes risk-based cleanups more workable." 18
These UECA study committee report comments reflect some recognition by NCCUSL
that local communities and land use planners are often excluded from decisions about
when it is appropriate to permit the use of an environmental covenant. There is no
indication in these comments, however, that this was a consideration that would factor
into NCCUSL's drafting of UECA. The comments also suggest a misunderstanding of
why there is often opposition to the use of environmental covenants at particular sites.
This opposition does not stem from an ideological rejection of risk-based analysis, but
rather stems from practical concerns and actual experience that the use of risk-based
corrective action in conjunction with environmental covenants often conflicts with other
public health considerations and land use policies. These practical concerns include
whether it makes sense to restrict a property to industrial use if it is located in an area
whose economy is transitioning away from industrial uses, or whether it is appropriate for
a particular residential site to be completely paved over to prevent residents from coming
into contact with contaminated subsurface soils.
By characterizing such concerns as primarily ideological in nature, UECA's drafters were
able to more easily discount them as wrongheaded and therefore not meriting closer
scrutiny. This discounting enabled the drafters to focus their attention more on the
concerns that had prompted the Defense Department to approach NCCUSL about a
UECA, namely the better integration of traditional real estate law considerations in the
context of the recording and enforcement of environmental covenants.

When judged by the limited parameters and goals adopted as part of the UECA drafting
process, NCCUSL was by and large successful. UECA includes many provisions that do
in fact help reconcile the use of environmental covenants with traditional real estate law.
For instance, UECA clarifies that the land use restrictions set forth in environmental
covenants are servitudes that run with the land and must have designated grantors and
grantees. 19 As another example, UECA exempts environmental covenants from the
requirements of the Uniform Marketable Title Act, which provides that most restrictive
property covenants expire after a set period of time unless rerecorded.20 UECA also
provides for enforcement of environmental covenants by the grantor, the grantee, the
environmental agency, local municipal governments, and other parties with a tangible
interest in the real property-an expansion of the more limited enforcement provisions for
most other deed restrictions.21
By themselves, these UECA provisions are not objectionable in their clarification of the
legal status of environmental covenants. The problem, however, is that in clarifying the
legal status of environmental covenants, UECA is also helping to facilitate their more
widespread use. Given that there remains considerable apprehension about the
inappropriate use of environmental covenants, UECA'S facilitation of their widespread
use seems to be putting the cart before the horse. Perhaps this is why UECA has so far
received such a lackluster response from environmentalists.
FRONT-END QUESTIONS
The shortcomings of UECA are on the front end, at the point when state and local
environmental agencies decide to approve environmental covenants at a particular site.
Section 6 ofUECA is entitled "Relationship to Other Land Use Law" and provides that
"An environmental covenant may prohibit or restrict uses of real property which are
authorized by zoning or by law other than this Act."22 NCCUSL's comment to Section 6
of UECA explains that "the Act contemplates that an environmental covenant might, for
example, prohibit residential use on a parcel subject to a covenant .... [S]uch a
prohibition or restriction in an environmental covenant will be valid even if other real
property law, including local zoning, would authorize the use for residential purposes. "23
It is here, in section 6, where UECA'S omissions and inadequacies are most apparent.
Section 6 and its accompanying comment confirm that there will be cases where
environmental covenants will expressly prohibit uses that zoning laws expressly permit,
and that in such cases the restrictions in the environmental covenants will legally trump
zoning law. Yet, and somewhat remarkably, UECA does not contain any further
provisions or commentary that consider the implications of this position for the local
legislative bodies that adopt zoning laws or the citizens who elect these legislative bodies.
In drafting UECA, NCCUSL appears to have made no attempt to anticipate or
accommodate the concerns of those who might disagree with the initial decision to use an
environmental covenant at a particular site to reduce cleanup costs. More specifically,
there are several provisions that NCCUSL could have included in UECA but did not in
this regard, none of which would have intruded significantly on existing state or local
law.

For example, although UECA does not prohibit environmental agencies from working
with local land use agencies before agreeing to environmental covenants at a particular
site, it does not require environmental agencies to obtain the prior consent of such local
land use agencies when restrictions on otherwise permitted uses are proposed. Such a
prior consent provision would help ensure that local land use agencies are consulted
beforehand and persuaded that a land use restriction proposed in an environmental
covenant is not in conflict with broader zoning and general plan provisions.
As another example, UECA is silent on the question of providing appropriate
opportunities for public comment on a proposed environmental covenant. Instead of this
silence, UECA could have established that prior to entering into an agreement with an
owner or developer of private property for the recordation of an environmental covenant,
environmental agencies must provide a public comment period and hold a public hearing.
As a final example, UECA could have required that a state or local environmental agency
prepare a land use restriction assessment before entering into an agreement with an owner
or developer of private property for the recordation of an environmental covenant. This
assessment could evaluate whether the use restrictions proposed in the environmental
covenant limit land uses permitted or anticipated in zoning codes, general plans, or other
community economic development plans. To the extent such conflicts exist, the
assessment could explain why use of the proposed environmental covenant is nonetheless
warranted in the particular instance.
Instead of including any of these front end requirements or some combination of them,
UECA instead left it entirely to states and local governments to adopt (or not adopt)
procedures to determine whether proposed environmental covenants conflict with local
land use laws and to provide for public participation by the adjacent community.24
To provide a mechanism to remove environmental covenants that are later found to be
inappropriate, UECA does establish a back-end process wherein environmental covenants
can be lifted either with a grantor's permission or without a grantor's permission if a court
finds that removing the use restrictions will not have an adverse effect on human health
and the environment.25 On a practical level, however, there are many limitations to this
back -end approach.
First, once above-ground structures (such as factories or warehouses) have been built on a
parcel in reliance on an environmental covenant, the very presence of these aboveground
structures often renders additional subsurface remediation cost-prohibitive. Second, even
if removal of an environmental covenant is ultimately approved by a court, UECA would
likely shield the initial grantor from responsibility for additional cleanup costs. Third, the
potential costs and uncertainty of litigation seeking the removal of an environmental
covenant over a grantor's opposition provides grantors with considerable leverage to
extract payments from those wishing to obtain the grantor's permission for such removal.
As such, UECA's inclusion of back-end procedures to extinguish environmental
covenants does not make up for its shortcomings on the front end.

OF DIRT AND SLUDGE
The drafters and supporters ofUEGA have described the act as the successful
reconciliation of the concerns of "dirt" lawyers (real estate law attorneys) and "sludge"
lawyers (environmental attorneys).26 One of the problems with this characterization,
however, is that it fails to recognize that within the environmental bar, a distinction is
often drawn between the "brown bar" (those attorneys who primarily represent clients
seeking to reduce their financial liability for cleanup costs) and the "green bar" (those
environmental attorneys who represent agencies or clients primarily seeking to strengthen
protection of public health and the environment). The sludge lawyers referred to by
UECA's drafters and supporters are generally associated with the brown bar and are
therefore often considered suspect by members of the green bar and the environmental
interests and organizations the green bar represents.
Without the support of the green bar and environmentalists, as well as urban
neighborhoods where many brownfields are located, the prospects for UECA's adoption
by states around the country looks less than promising. Assertions by NCCUSL, the
Defense Department, and sludge lawyers that UECA is good for the environment, good
for public health, and good for local communities are likely to be received with an
appropriate dose of skepticism. As Professor Engel has indicated, this skepticism will
remain unless there are effective mechanisms to ensure that the "probability of
environmental harm is minimal and the potential economic benefits are large" to the
communities where risk-based cleanups and environmental covenants are proposed.27
These are mechanisms that UECA presently lacks.
Instead of trying to persuade states to pass the current version of UECA over the
objections of environmentalists, environmental justice advocates, and members of the
green bar with legitimate concerns about the misuse of environmental covenants, a better
course of action would be for NCCUSL to reopen the UECA drafting process and to
make certain these other stakeholders participate this time around. With these formerly
absent interests involved, it may be possible for NCCUSL to craft a revised UECA that
meaningfully addresses the front-end complexities associated with environmental
covenants. What the current version of UECA makes clear, however, is that the hard
brownfield questions will not be answered if the hard brownfield questions are not asked.
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